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SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
The Journal of Legal Commentary is pleased to present the second
edition of the Survey of Professional Responsibility. The Survey exam-
ines current issues pertaining to ethical conduct in the legal
community.
The 1989 Survey contains three articles. The first examines a
controversial topic: When may a criminal defense attorney dis-
close his client's future perjurious testimony? The second article
discusses attorney liability to nonclients. It gives a general over-
view of current trends in various states while it specifically ad-
dresses New York's privity requirement. The Survey concludes
with an article that examines a recent decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Sparks v. Character and Fitness
Committee of Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit granted judicial immunity
to a judge and bar committee members for their acts in evaluating
a bar applicant's moral and character fitness to practice law.
It is the hope of the Editors that these articles will assist both
students and practitioners in their legal endeavors.
UNITED STATES V. LONG: WHEN MAY A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
ATTORNEY DISCLOSE HIS CLIENT'S FUTURE PERJURIOUS TESTIMONY?
I. THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S DILEMMA
Among the varied roles of a criminal defense attorney, two of
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the most pronounced are that of defendant's "zealous advocate" 1
with its attendant obligation to hold all client communications
confidential, 2 and that of "officer of the court"3 with its corre-
See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (sixth
amendment requires client receive zealous and loyal advocacy): United States ex rel. Wilcox
v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) (defense counsel in criminal case assumes
zealous advocate role as well as officer of the court role); John v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949,
952 (E.D. Va. 1959) (cardinal rule that attorney must serve client with "complete loyalty")
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (A) (1981) (attorney must represent
client zealously): see also Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966) ("It is essential to the
effective functioning of this system" for attorney to have "warm zeal" for client);
Gershman, Reflections on Client Perjury, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1987, at 31 (criminal defense
lawyer plays the role of "legal champion" of the client) McCall, Nix V. Whiteside: The
Lawyer's Response to Perjury, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443, 446 (1986). "If the concept of
the advocate role is pushed to an extreme, it can be conceived of as an 'alter ego advocate'.
. . . Id.
2 MODEL CODE Or PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B), (C) (1980) (lawyer shall not
knowingly reveal confidence or secret of client).
Courts have placed a great deal of emphasis on the attorney client privilege and the
related duty of confidentiality. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(attorney-client privilege is oldest of confidential communication privileges); Cuno, Inc. v.
Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (attorney-client privilege is to encourage
client to disclose all information necessary to insure an effective representation in the inter-
ests of justice): General Realty Assocs. v. Walters, 136 Misc. 2d 1027, 1028-29, 519
N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (Civ. Ct. 1987). "The confidentiality mandated [under DR 4-101(B)l ...
is a cherished cornerstone of our jurisprudence, grounded in the policy that clients must be
encouraged to disclose all to their attorneys, so that the latter may render the most effec-
tive representation." Id.; Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside On Attorney-Client
Relations, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1919-23 (1988) (discussing ethical duties of attorneys);
see also Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1 LITIGATION 26, 26 (1975). A "lawyer
must hold in strictest confidence the disclosures made by the client in the course of the
professional relationship." Id.; Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitu-
tional and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985). "The obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of client communications derives from two related bodies of law, the confi-
dentiality rules established in professional ethics and the attorney-client privilege in the law
of evidence." Id. at 122 n.7. But see Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (Cardozo,
J.). "A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a
fraud will have no help from the law." Id. See generally Hazard, An Historical Perspective on
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1069-91 (1978) (discussing variety of
confidentiality standards in historic cases).
' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1981); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 723 (1973) (Connecticut codified maxim that an attorney is an officer of the court);
United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) (defense counsel
in criminal case assumes role as officer of the court as well as role as zealous advocate);
Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975). "[A]ny counsel is an officer of
the court ....": In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 261, 322 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1958) (attorney is
bound by "officer of the court" status to ensure truthful testimony by client); See also H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 69-88 (1953) (characteristics of legal profession includes "officer of
the court"); McCall, supra note 1. "One conception of the proper role for a criminal de-
fense counsel is that of 'offi.cer of the court'." Id. at 446.; Note, Truth or Confidences: Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel and Client Perjury - Nix v. Whiteside, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 145,
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sponding obligation to "maintain the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem.' Generally performed simultaneously in relative harmony,
these roles can conflict when a criminal defense attorney believes
that his client will perjure himself if and when he takes the stand.6
146 (1986) ("officer of the court . . . is expected to do everything possible to uphold the
integrity of the judicial system.").
' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon I (1981): In re Carroll, 244
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951). "fAls an officer of the court ... [an attorney'sl constant duty lisi to
maintain the integrity of our judicial system ... ." Id. at 475; see People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-73, 162 N.E. 487, 489-90 (1928) (general characterization of
obligations of officer of the court): Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62
MINN. L. REV. 89, 89 (1977). "As an officer of the court, a lawyer is sworn . . . to promote
the ends of justice." Id. See also Gershman, supra note 1, at 31 (criminal defense lawyer
plays role of "gatekeeper" of the "temple ofjustice"); McCall, supra note 1, at 446. "[O]ne
duty of an officer of the court would seem to be to take all steps necessary to prevent
perjury from occurring in the court. ... Id.; Note, supra note 3, at 146 (attorney "ex-
pected to do everything possible to uphold the integrity of the judicial system").
See United States v. Seavey, 180 F.2d 837, 839 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979
(1950). Perjury, an offense at common law, is generally defined as the "false swearing in a
material matter requiring affidavit or oath to be taken, with the knowledge . . . that the
false swearing is false." Id.; United States v. Neal, 822 F.2d 1502, 1506 (10th Cir. 1987).
"[P]erjury has been defined ... as the act of 'knowingly and willfully giving false testimony
relating to a material matter.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 730 F.2d 593, 597
(10th Cir. 1984)); Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984). "Perjury is the
willful assertion under oath of a false, material fact." Id.
"The most difficult situation . . . arises in a criminal case where the accused insists on
testifying when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perjurious." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983); see also Hazard, supra note 2, at 1091. With
regard to the attorney-client privilege, "[t]he difficult problem is where to draw the bound-
aries-how to define the kinds of secrets that a lawyer may not keep." Id. But see State v.
Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 59, 679 P.2d 174, 180 (1984). After attorney was denied leave to
withdraw, permitting client to tell his perjurious story from the stand without conventional
direct examination or encouragement by attorney was not in violation of Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. Id.; Goodwin v. Covington, 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1982).
Attorneys were held in contempt of court for refusing court order to continue representa-
tion of client who revealed to the attorneys that he would perjure himself. Id. Recognizing
the ethical dilemma, the court did not impose sanctions. Id.
In lieu of making disclosure to the court, there exist reasonable alternative actions, such
as continued modified representation, with the attorney refusing to question his client re-
garding the perjurious testimony, or a motion for immediate withdrawal. See Lowery v.
Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (carefully modified representation when
withdrawal not possible); In re A, 276 Or. 225, 240, 554 P.2d 479, 487 (1976) (Oregon
State Bar Opinion mandating withdrawal where client refuses to allow disclosure): MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983) (three resolutions have been
proposed: permitting client narrative testimony without assistance of counsel, absolute non-
disclosure of client perjurious testimony, or full disclosure of perjurious testimony if that is
the only remedy to the situation): Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense
Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966) (if placed in a position of
questioning a perjurious client, after dissuasion and withdrawal have failed, the attorney
"should confine himself to asking the witness to identify himself and to make a statement,
but he cannot participate in the fraud by conventional direct examination."). But see Bow-
313
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 311, 1989
Initially, it would appear that if the attorney discloses his concerns
of possible forthcoming perjurious testimony to the court, the de-
fendant's constitutional right to effective counsel,6 his right to tes-
tify on his own behalF and the attorney's duty to preserve the
man, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5
Am. CRIM. L.Q. 28, 30 (1966) (it is not proper "for defense counsel to present the defend-
ant's testimony in a fashion that may lead the jury to conclude that counsel does not be-
lieve his client."). A proposed solution to the dilemma calls for an Advisory Council for
each jurisdiction. Consisting of knowledgeable lawyers, this Council would provide prompt
and confidential advice to attorneys seeking assistance in matters of professional conduct in
criminal cases. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980) (discussed in Erickson,
The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obliga-
tions to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75, 88-91 (1981)).
s U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). The Court adopted a two-part standard for evaluating ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims. Id. at 687. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Id. "Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense." Id. This means that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694:
United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986). Defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel when his attorney refused to allow him to testify, not upon a belief of
perjurious testimony, but rather upon an implausible defense and prior conviction im-
peachment. Id. at 1146; State v. Long, 148 Ariz. 295, 296-97, 714 P.2d 465, 466-67 (Ct.
App. 1986). Defendant was not denied effective counsel when his attorney failed to stop
defendant, temporarily pro se, from calling a perjurious witness. Id.; Goodwin v. Coving-
ton, 279 S.C. 274, 277-78, 305 S.E.2d 578, 579-80 (1983). Attorneys of a client intending
to perjure himself who refused to follow the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION, § 7.7 (continue representation, allow client to take stand and deliver narrative
statement, and refrain from examination on false testimony in summation) on the belief
that it would deny their client effective assistance of counsel were held in contempt of
court following denial of motion to withdraw. Id. See generally Rieger, supra note 2, at 143-
44 (right to effective counsel grounded in sixth amendment); Comment, Proposed Client
Perjury: A Criminal Defense Attorney's Alternatives, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 248, 262 (1983) (right
to effective counsel "may reach constitutional proportions").
See United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant has per-
sonal right to testify which cannot be waived by counsel), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064
(1986): United States ex rel. Wilcox v.Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977) (criminal
defendant had statutory right to testify under Pennsylvania law); United States v. Butts,
630 F. Supp. at 1149 (defendant not allowed to testify by attorney's strategy was granted
new trial on basis that "opportunity to testify" was denied); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44
(1987). "lit cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense." Id.; Rieger, supra note 2, at 128-29
(lower court holdings and Supreme Court dicta support criminal defendant's right to tes-
tify on own behalf): Comment, supra note 6, at 260-62 (discussion of criminal defendant's
rights to testify and support for likelihood of its existence).
Modern view contradicts the traditional common law position. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE §§ 576, 579 a. Chadbourn rev. 1979) (historic common law view denied any party
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confidentiality of a client's communications8 may be violated. On
the other hand, if the attorney chooses to remain silent, he may
breach his duty as an officer of the court by knowingly offering
perjured testimony.9
The tension between a criminal defendant's right to effective
counsel1" and the attorney's duty to offer truthful testimony" is
reflected in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 2 The
comment to Rule 3.3 provides that if an attorney is aware that his
client is offering false evidence, he should first try to convince the
client not to testify falsely. 3 If that fails, the attorney should seek
to withdraw if that will remedy the situation." As a last resort, the
Model Rules allow the advocate to disclose the fraud to the court
and have it decide how to proceed. 5
Historically, there have been proponents on both sides of this
issue.1 In 1986, however, the Supreme Court held, in Nix v.
Whiteside,' that the right to effective counsel does not encompass
the right to assistance of counsel in testifying falsely.' 8 In Nix, the
defendant had been charged with murder and was claiming self-
defense.' 9 He informed his attorney that he believed his victim
to litigation right to testify due to interest in outcome).
8 See supra note 2.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980) (lawyer must not
"Iklnowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence"). See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 174 (1986) ("IR]ule ... to remain silent while his client committed perjury, is wholly
incompatible with the established standards of ethical conduct ...."); In re Carroll, 244
S.W.2d 474, 474 (Ky. 1951) ("[ajttorney should not sit by silently" while client commits
perjury); Freedman, supra note 2, at 27 (lawyer should not use perjured testimony where
he has foreknowledge of it); McCall, supra note 1, at 446 ("[Olne duty of an officer of the
court would seem to be to take all steps necessary to prevent perjury from occurring in the
court ....").
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
1 See MODEL CODE, supra note 9.
12 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983) (as amended 1987) (law-
yer may not knowingly offer false testimony).
11 Id. at Rule 3.3 comment.
14 Id.
Id.
Compare Freedman, supra note 1, at 1477-78 (1966) (attorney must allow client to
testify falsely if attempts to dissuade him have failed) with Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy
and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1966) ("The partisanship
involved in keeping a communication confidential must be restricted when it leads to con-
duct which ...presents perjury to the factfinder.").
1 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
I8 Id. at 171-74.
19 Id. at 160.
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had been reaching for a gun even though he did not actually see
one.2" Shortly before trial, the defendant, Whiteside, told his at-
torney that he would testify that he saw "something metallic" in
the victim's hand, effectively offering a false account.21 The law-
yer threatened to withdraw and inform the court of the intended
perjury.2" Whiteside, thereafter, testified truthfully and was con-
victed of second degree murder. 3 He moved for a new trial,
claiming that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. 4
In upholding the conviction, the Court established that although
counsel must be a zealous advocate for his client, his "duty [of
loyalty] is limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with
the very nature of a trial as a search for truth."2 5
While the Nix Court allowed for an attorney to disclose impend-
ing perjury by his client," it did not clearly define the standard of
belief a criminal defense attorney must possess before making
such a disclosure.17 This Survey will examine the different ap-
proaches with regard to this important threshold question while
focusing on a recent Eighth Circuit decision.
In United States v. Long, 8 the Eighth Circuit, quoting from its
opinion in Whiteside v. Scurr,2 9 held that before an attorney can
notify the court of his client's intent to commit perjury, he must
have a "firm factual basis" for his belief." In Long, Thaddeus
20 Id. No weapon was recovered in the police search of the victim's apartment, and
shortly thereafter, relatives removed all of the possessions from the apartment. Id.
11 475 U.S. at 161.
12 Id.
23 Id. at 161-62.
24 Id. at 162.
26 475 U.S. at 166.
Id. at 171.
27 See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1984) (threshold question is
basis for counsel's belief that his client intends to testify falsely; ABA presupposes counsel
"knows" based on either independent investigation or discussions with defendant or both),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 175 (1986); see, e.g., Appel, supra
note 2, at 1946. "[Tlhe key question remains unanswered: what standard of knowing is
required before a lawyer may threaten to reveal a client confidence ... ?" Id.: Note, supra
note 3, at 163 ("ITIhe strength of the evidence giving rise to the attorney's belief that the
client will commit perjury" is one factor court will use when determining if defendant's
rights were violated).
28 857 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1988).
29 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986).
"o Long, 857 F.2d at 444 (quoting Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328).
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Adonis Long and Edward Larry Jackson were charged with vari-
ous crimes stemming from their participation in a check forging
and bank fraud scheme designed to defraud the United States
Treasury.31 During trial, Jackson's counsel, having doubts about
the truthfulness of his client's forthcoming testimony, advised
Jackson not to testify on his own behalf and subsequently dis-
closed his concerns to the court." The trial judge then counseled
Jackson on his rights to take the stand and give narrative testi-
mony without questioning from his attorney.3 The judge warned
Jackson that his attorney may have "other obligations" if he of-
fered perjurious testimony. 4 Jackson decided to waive his right to
testify. Both Jackson and Long were convicted on all counts. 36
On appeal, Jackson contended that his attorney's actions led to
the deprivation of his constitutional rights to effective counsel and
to testify on his own behalf.3" The Eighth Circuit acknowledged
that, under Nix, if a criminal defense attorney is unable to dis-
suade his client from committing perjury, he must disclose the cli-
ent's confidence. 38 However, the court distinguished Nix and
adopted a higher standard, holding that prior to making such a
disclosure, there must be a "clear expression of intent to commit
perjury"3 9 based upon a "firm factual basis."40 Although the court
affirmed the convictions, it held that a collateral proceeding in ac-
cordance with 28 U.S.C. section 2255 would be the proper forum
to address Jackson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim."'
" Long, 857 F.2d at 439.
31 Id. at 443-44.
11 Id. at 444.
34 Id.
"' Long, 857 F.2d at 444.
36 Id. at 439-40.
"' Id. at 443 (defendant claimed that attorney's suggestion to judge that client might
perjure himself resulted in warning by trial judge; this, in turn, allegedly coerced client
into not testifying): see generally notes 6 & 7 (discussion of criminal defendant's rights to
effective counsel and to take stand on his own behalf).
38 857 F.2d at 444-45.
sg Id. at 445.
40 Id. "Counsel must act if, but only if, he or she has 'a firm factual basis' for believing
that the defendant intends to testify falsely . (quoting Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d
1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1984)).
"' 857 F.2d at 447.
In a § 2255 collateral proceeding:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
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II. DIFFERING STANDARDS
It is suggested that the Eighth Circuit's standard of "firm fac-
tual basis" strikes an appropriate balance between an attorney's
duty as an advocate for his client and his role as officer of the
court. 42 This is the majority view of the standard of belief which
should be applied in judging an attorney's disclosure of a criminal
defendant's impending perjury.43 One jurisdiction, however, has
held that a "reasonable belief" standard provides adequate pro-
tection of the attorney-client relationship and the client's right to
effective counsel while allowing disclosure in more instances than
would be available under the "firm factual basis" standard. 44 Con-
versely, those who envision greater protection for the lawyer's
role as "advocate" have proposed an "actual knowledge" stan-
dard, thus reducing the duty of an attorney to disclose anticipated
perjury by limiting the situations in which such a duty would
arise.543
A. Actual Knowledge
The proponents of the actual knowledge standard typically
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
'3 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977)("without possessing a firm factual basis for that belief [that client will commit perjury], he
would be violating the duty imposed upon him as defense counsel"); People v. Schultheis,
638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981) (belief must be based on independent investigation of the
evidence) State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App. 535, 542, 429 A.2d 244, 248 (1981) ("compelling
support" required for attorney's standard of belief) (citing State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d
468, 470 (Iowa 1978)); State v. Fleck, 49 Wash. App. 584, 587, 744 P.2d 628, 629-30
(1987) (attorney had "adequate basis" for his belief based upon information received from
jailhouse informer and defendant's refusal to deny he was lying); State v. James, 48 Wash.
App. 353, 367, 739 P.2d 1161, 1169 (1987) ("gut level belief" in possible perjury
insufficient).
14 See, e.g., State v. Poole, 289 S.E.2d 335, 340 (N.C. 1982) (counsel may refuse to be
party to presentation of testimony that he "reasonably believes" to be perjurious); State v.
Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1976) (client has no right to assistance of
counsel in presenting what counsel "reasonably believes" is perjurious).
41 See infra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text.
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predicate their position upon ethics codes such as the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility which ex-
pressly prohibits an attorney from knowingly using perjured testi-
mony. 6 Thus, if an attorney does not know with absolute cer-
tainty that the forthcoming testimony will be false, he should "put
the evidence on."'47 Because an attorney will not often have such
actual knowledge of imminent perjury, he would be permitted to
disclose his doubts as to the veracity of testimony on few occa-
sions.48 Therefore, the utilization of this standard may be con-
trary to an attorney's officer of the court role which the Supreme
Court emphasized in Nix. In fact, at least one ardent proponent of
the "zealous advocate" role, Professor Freedman, proposes using
this standard as a sword to negate the holding in Nix.49
B. Firm Factual Basis
Though not as severe as "actual knowledge," the Eighth Cir-
cuit's "firm factual basis" standard is a stringent one. Indeed, the
Long court did note that "[ilt will be a rare case in which this fac-
tual requirement is met."5 Not only must there be "a clear ex-
pression of intent" to commit perjury,5" but an attorney must be
aware that a statement of intention does not necessarily mean a
4" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980). "[A] lawyer
shall not . . . [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence." (emphasis added). See,
e.g., Appel, supra note 2, at 1937 (duty "to take affirmative action to prevent client perjury
. . . generally arisels] only when an attorney 'knows' that the client intends to testify
falsely."): Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking The Defense Law-
yer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 668 n.12 (1978) (no authority has indicated that
Code is violated where counsel permits client to testify to matter believed to be false).
" Stewart, Drawing the Line at Lying, 72 A.B.A., May 1, 1986, at 88 (where there is only
some doubt in attorney's mind as to truthfulness of witness, attorney is not certain that
testimony will be false; therefore he must present evidence); But see In re Carroll, 244
S.W.2d 474, 474-75 (Ky. 1951) ('[u]nder any standard of proper ethical conduct," a lawyer
should not refrain from preventing or correcting his client's perjury or other misleading
testimony).
" See Appel, supra note 2, at 1937 ("[o]nly rarely will a lawyer know both that proposed
testimony is false and that the client is determined to offer the false testimony at trial.").
" Freedman, The Aftermath of Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora's Box, 23
GRIM. L. BULL. 25, 28-29 (1987) (discussing potential approaches to accommodate Nix
holding).
0 United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Whiteside v. Scurr,
744 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986)).
a' Id.
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client will in fact lie to the court. 2 The Long court signals its ap-
prehensions by noting that a lawyer who discloses to the court
merely on the belief of possible client perjury takes on the role of
the factfinder,53 thereby threatening to subvert the delicate bal-
ance of the adversarial court system by overstepping his role as an
advocate.5 Although remaining somewhat elevated, this standard
does allow disclosure when there is a substantial basis for belief of
forthcoming perjurious testimony. It is submitted that this is a
much more realistic threshold than that of "actual knowledge"
and one under which the Nix view of lawyer as officer of the court
may survive and have practical significance.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Eighth Circuit's standard of "firm factual ba-
sis" would require an attorney to maintain his role as zealous ad-
vocate by preserving client confidentiality unless he has a substan-
tial basis for belief of forthcoming client perjury. This would
serve to safeguard the criminal defendant's constitutional rights
while allowing for a more realistic and practical opportunity for
survival of the Nix Court's subordination of the zealous advocate
role to that of officer of the court.
Anthony P. Giustino
52 Id. (client may change his mind once he "hears the testimony of other witnesses, takes
an oath, faces a judge and jury, and contemplates the prospect of cross examination by
opposing counsel .... ").
" Id. at 445 (court heeds Justice Blackmun's warning from Nix that lawyer who acts on
belief of possible perjury takes on role of jury).
54 857 F.2d at 445. The court's apprehensions are shared by other courts and commen-
tators. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977)
(court distinguishes role of judge and jury from that of defense counsel and cautions that
attorney disclosing his client's confidences "without possessing a firm factual basis for that
belief ... would be violating the duty imposed upon him as a defense counsel"); People v.
Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981) (court cautions that lawyer's belief "must be based
upon an independent investigation" or upon "distinct statements by his client or the wit-
ness which support that belief").
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